Are We Heading Back to an Age of Traditional Wars Between Major Powers?
Valter Coralluzzo
In the aftermath of the “five-day war” between Russia and
Georgia (8-12 August 2008) ‒ which in practice was a major
offensive by Russian armed forces on Georgian territory, in the
name of defending the separatist republics of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, of which Tbilisi was seeking to regain control
through military power ‒ Robert Kagan, a leading figure in
American neo-conservative circles, observed that the conflict
represented no less significant a turning point in recent history
than the fall of the Berlin Wall. It marked, he wrote, “the
official return of history... to an almost XIX century style of
great-power competition, complete with virulent nationalisms,
battles for resources, struggles over spheres of influence and
territory, and even — though it shocks our XXI century
sensibilities — the use of military power to obtain geopolitical
objectives”.1
Furthermore, this confirmed the central thesis of
the book that Kagan had just published,2
in which he scorned the optimistic and widely cherished illusion
that the end of the Cold War had spawned a new international order,
characterised by the disappearance of any serious reason for conflict between
states. Instead, he argued that those years had been “just a
1
R. Kagan, “Il pretesto del nazionalismo”, Corriere della Sera, 21 August 2008. 2
Id., The Return of History and the End of Dreams, 2008; Italian translation Il ritorno
della storia e la fine dei sogni, Milan, Mondadori, 2008.
44 Back to the Future
momentary pause in the eternal competition between peoples
and nations”3 and that in the decades to come, the traditional
geopolitical contest between major powers would return to the
fore, in a global context increasingly marked by the perennial
clash between democracies and autocracies.
Kagan’s commentary on the “August War” between Russia
and Georgia is a perfect fit for the current context. Many
features of what can be rightly seen as Europe’s first (albeit
underestimated) war of the XXI century are in fact being
amplified in the ongoing war of aggression in Ukraine, which
is generally depicted as a classical, conventional, symmetrical,
high-intensity, large-scale conflict between regular armies
(albeit backed up by private military groups) striving to conquer
territory and positions of advantage by making widespread
use of armoured vehicles and heavy artillery: in other words,
a conflict that has undoubtedly brought traditional war back
to the heart of Europe, in a form that resembles the two world
wars in many respects. Public opinion, the media, political
decision-makers and various analysts were clearly taken aback:
until the very last moment and despite the US’s well-founded
forewarnings of an imminent attack by Russia on Ukraine,
many denied that such an event could actually happen. For
others, however, Russia’s attack came as a surprise only in its
form, not its substance, because it could easily be seen as a
natural (and hence predictable) step in the development of post
Soviet Russian foreign policy, which had long been focused on
the increasingly aggressive and unscrupulous struggle to gain
recognition of its status as a major power.
The Decline-of-War Thesis
To fully understand why there is a stubborn refusal to see a war
of the type unleashed by Putin’s Russia at dawn on 24 February
2022 as a real possibility ‒ despite the fact that this was no bolt
3 Ivi, p. 14.
Are We Heading Back to an Age of Traditional Wars Between Major Powers? 45
from the blue, but a sharp escalation of the conflict that had
been going on in the Donbass since 2014 ‒ it is worth bearing
in mind that all of us, like the Gauls who opposed Caesar,
tend to be bound by the logic under which “men willingly
believe what they wish”.4
It is no coincidence that the cognitive
sciences used for the purposes of prediction and strategic
decision-making warn of the danger posed by factors (such as
beliefs, values and illusions) that act as a filter on the impartial
examination of facts, thus undermining our ability to question
our beliefs and causing us to fall into cognitive traps (giving
credence only to information that confirms our expectations,
or fitting incoming information to our existing world-views)
that generate a skewed picture of reality. In this case, the RussiaUkraine
conflict seriously calls into question a number of deepseated beliefs about
war, its recent transformations and its future development. Shaped by the
lively debate on these issues over recent decades, especially in strategic
and international studies, these beliefs are based on two assumptions that have
gained broad (but not unanimous) consensus among scholars:
firstly that the age of traditional wars between sovereign states
is over, and secondly that wars between major powers have
been consigned to history. Usually lumped together under the
more general and inclusive heading “the decline of war”, these
assumptions, which appear to accurately reflect the historical
experience of the Cold War and post-bipolar eras, warrant
careful consideration.
Over a century has passed since George Gooch, a British
historian, wrote: “We can now look forward with something
like confidence to the time when war between civilised nations
will be as antiquated as the duel”.5
The most authoritative conflict datasets give reason to believe that this time
has come, which is why, a few years ago, Thomas Barnett claimed that
4
J. Caesar, Commentarii de Bello Gallico, Book III, 18, 6. 5
G.P. Gooch, History of Our Time, 1885-1911, London, Williams and Norgate,
1911, pp. 248-249.
46 Back to the Future
“state-on-state war has gone the way of the dinosaur”.6
These data sets clearly show that since 1945, despite a large rise in the
number of states, the number of classical international wars
‒ i.e. conventional, symmetrical conflicts between sovereign
states fought around a military front by regular armies using
comparable weapons, tactics and strategies – has fallen so
drastically, that such wars have become rare and, in certain
parts of the world, a thing of the past. This has spawned the
idea of a world of two halves, in which zones of peace (within the
confines of the Euro-Atlantic security community), benefiting
from economic development, political stability and liberal
democracy, co-exist with zones of turmoil (the rest of the world),
where in “strong” states (i.e. states capable of fulfilling their
sovereign functions), power politics and the security dilemma
dictate the rules of the game, and in “weak” states (i.e. states
unable to acquire legitimacy by providing security and other
services), civil wars and territorial fragmentation proliferate7
.
While the two-worlds narrative may look somewhat
contrived, the fact remains that the few interstate conflicts
fought in recent decades ‒ whether minor conflicts or those
classified as full-scale wars on the basis that they have exceeded
the conventional threshold of 1,000 deaths in battle per year8
‒ have been geographically confined to peripheral or semiperipheral
areas of the international system. Furthermore, these
conflicts have almost invariably involved minor actors. Where
they have involved the system’s major powers, they have never
developed into direct conflicts on the ground between those
powers, but only into proxy wars (i.e. wars between minor
players each protected by a major power). Alternatively, they
have involved indirect, covert, unconventional or hybrid forms
6
T.P.M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map, New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004,
p. 271.
7
M. Singer and A. Wildavski, The Real World Order. Zones of Peaces,
Zones of Turmoil, Chatham (NJ), Chatham House, 1993.
8
Battle-related deaths include military and civilian fatalities caused by traditional
battlefield fighting, guerrilla activities and bombardments of all types.
Are We Heading Back to an Age of Traditional Wars Between Major Powers? 47
of warfare. In other cases again, they have pitted a major power
(perhaps at the head of a broad coalition of states) against a
minor power or non-state actors of a criminal or terrorist
nature. This latter category takes the name “policing wars”,9
by
which western countries (first and foremost the United States)
have attempted to restore order in nations torn by civil war,
destabilise nations deemed to be “rogue states” (to the point
of regime change, by playing the Nazi card against the dictator
of the day), or counter the activity of criminal or terrorist
organisations by military means. Even Mary Kaldor, whose
best-known book10 occasionally appears to stereotype postbipolar
wars as “new wars” ‒ which are basically domestic wars
fought in the context of failing states (failing due to the impact
of globalisation), by non-state actors in the name of identity
politics ‒ has referred to this type of conflict as “spectacle war”
and “neo-modern war”11. The former is the remote, hypertechnological, casualty-free form of
warfare typical of a “postheroic” western world12 whose citizens are no longer willing to
sacrifice their lives in war, but get involved in it only as distant
spectators (because it is reduced to a kind of virtual simulation
attracting a disproportionate amount of media attention). The
latter can take the form of a limited interstate war, usually
attributable to border disputes; or a counter-insurgency war
triggered by the increasing political polarisation of fear and
hatred that characterises “new wars”.
Interstate war is becoming rarer, but seeing this as
confirmation of its actual or imminent demise may be wishful
thinking. The latest evidence, in fact, points to an increase in
the frequency and lethality of inter-state conflicts.13 There is
9
C. Holmqvist, Policing Wars. On Military Intervention in the Twenty-First Century,
London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
10 M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organized violence in a Global Era, 1999. 11 Id., Global Civil Society: An Answer to War, 2003. 12 E.N. Luttwak, Towards Post-Heroic Warfare, in “Foreign Affairs”, vol. 74, no. 3,
1995
13 S. Davies, T. Pettersson, and M. Öberg, “Organized Violence 1989-2021 and
48 Back to the Future
no doubt, however, that many factors militate against recourse
to this type of war. Firstly, war has become more destructive
and less cost-effective ‒ a classically liberal idea expressed by
Norman Angell at the beginning of the XX century.14 Secondly,
the use of force has gradually lost legitimacy and war itself has
become a taboo. According to John Mueller, therefore, war is
not only “rationally” but also “subconsciously inconceivable”,15
to the extent that those who still have recourse to it feel obliged
to conceal it behind euphemisms such as “peace-enforcing”,
“humanitarian intervention” and “international policing
operations”, or to restore its legitimacy by opportunistically
leveraging the idea of the “just war”.16 Thirdly, under the
current international system, it has become impracticable to
pursue territorial conquest, which has always been one of the
main objectives of interstate wars but now seems to have been
eradicated, because the right to territorial integrity is so rooted
in the international political and legal order that it is obvious
to anyone that state borders cannot be unilaterally changed
and that any attempt to seize territory by force, even if it wins
domestic approval, will be considered illegitimate and seriously
damaging to the international reputation of a state, its ruling
elite or its leader. These factors ‒ alongside others, such as the
role played by democratisation, international institutions, the
deterrence mechanism and the “benevolent” hegemony of the
United States, whose “peacemaking” effect, however, appears to
have been diminishing for some time ‒ all play an important
role in explaining the decline of the classic interstate war and,
even more so, war between major powers. Many commentators,
meanwhile, have claimed that major war is a thing of the past,
Drone Warfare”, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 59, no. 4, 2022, pp. 593-610. 14 N. Angell, The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National
Advantage, 1910. 15 J. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War, New York, Basic
Books, 1989, p. 240.
16 A. Colombo, “La guerra in Ucraina e il trionfo contemporaneo della guerra
giusta”, La fionda, no. 2, 2022, pp. 28-40.
Are We Heading Back to an Age of Traditional Wars Between Major Powers?
49
on the basis that there is virtually no risk of such conflict
occurring today or in the foreseeable.17 But how far is this really true?
There can be no doubt that, since 1945, humankind
has enjoyed a “long peace”,18 which the system of nuclear
deterrence based on Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)
helped strengthen, by radically and irreversibly changing the
rational calculus of the costs and benefits of war and making
it “unthinkable”. Let us not forget, however, that history offers
other examples of long episodes of peace destined, nonetheless,
to end. The Cold War itself can certainly be regarded as a major
war, unlike all others in its form but similar in its consequences,
because it spawned a new international order built around the
hegemony of the United States. The fact that the Cold War
came to an end “without a single shot being fired in its main
theatre (Europe)”, however, “made it unable to give birth to an
actual constitutive peace: as if once again, as always and bitterly,
only a bloody victory won on the battlefield could transform
the power of the hegemon into legitimate authority”.19 To put it
another way, if a true international order can only be spawned by
a major war (which ruthlessly separates victor from vanquished,
and dominant from dominated), then “it follows that periods
of history without major wars are destined to witness great
disorder”.20 And it is an established fact that the end of the
17 The leading exponent of this school of thought is John Mueller. 20 years
after the publication of his best-known book (Retreat from Doomsday), he has
emphatically reiterated his arguments (J. Mueller, “War has almost ceased to exist:
An Assessment”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 124, No. 2, 2009, pp. 297-321).
For an opposing opinion, see J.W. Forsyth Jr. and T.E. Griffith Jr., “Through
the Glass Darkly: The Unlikely Demise of Great-Power War”, Strategic Studies
Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 1, 2007, pp. 96-115. 18 J.L. Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International
System”, International Security, vol. 10, no. 4, 1986, pp. 99-142. 19 V.E. Parsi, Il sistema politico globale: da uno a molti, in Id. (ed.), Che differenza può fare
un giorno, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 2003, p. 103. 20 L. Bonanate, Il futuro della guerra e le guerre del futuro, in Tullio Gregory (ed.), XXI
secolo, Roma, Istituto Enciclopedia Italiana Treccani, 2009, vol. 3, p. 434.
50 Back to the Future
“short century” marked the beginning of a period of increasing
disorder, complexity and unpredictability in international
politics. So in a context characterised thus far by the absence
of conflict (or even the mere expectation of war) between the
system’s major powers, how can we rule out the possibility of a
major war becoming at least “conceivable” again?
Like Alessandro Colombo, we could also ask ourselves
whether it still makes sense to use the term “major war” solely
to describe a war between major powers on a global scale, or
whether it should also apply to war between the major powers
of each regional system. This changes the picture dramatically:
although the prospect of a global war does not seem plausible,
“the same is not at all true if we shift the perspective to the
level of individual regions, with the sole and usual exception
of Europe and America”.21 This exception no longer seems
to apply, however, in light of what is happening in Ukraine,
where a local dyadic conflict (with several, generally overlooked
features typical of a civil war) has been transformed (since the
attrition of the Russian army made it clear to the Americans that
Ukraine was no longer a lost cause but a strategic opportunity
to weaken and marginalise Russia) into an anomalous proxy
war22 with growing potential for global destabilisation ‒ in other
words, a proxy war between Russia, whose claims for status
have triggered a kind of anti-Western crusade in the name of
multipolarism that seems capable of uniting all the revisionist
powers against the existing international order, and the United
States, which is committed to defending a world order in which
right trumps might (despite having resorted to “might” more
than once itself) ‒ not to say a “clash of civilisations” between
21 A. Colombo, “Guerra e discontinuità nelle relazioni internazionali. Il dibattito
sul declino della guerra e i suoi limiti”, Rivista italiana di scienza politica», vol. XLII,
no. 3, 2012, pp. 452-453
22 A. Giannuli offers a convincing explanation of why the widespread use of the
term “proxy war” to describe the Russia-Ukraine conflict is approximate and
inadequate in Spie in Ucraina, Milan, Ponte alle Grazie, 2022, pp. 157-158 and
182-185.
Are We Heading Back to an Age of Traditional Wars Between Major Powers?
51
the West and the non-West (see statements to this effect by
Putin and Kirill I, the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox
Church).23 As Ian Morris points out, at present “any move that
carries a risk of open war with the United States still requires
a good dose of folly”, but in the future “the possible benefits
may look very different to the emerging powers of 2030 and
2040”, and if so, we are likely to face an era that has “much
in common with the decade after 1910”.24 This confirms the
view of John Mearsheimer, one of the most radical critics of the
decline-of-war thesis, who maintains that the end of the Cold
War “did not lead to any attenuation in the anarchic structure
of the [international] system ‒ if anything it did the opposite ‒
and there is therefore no reason to expect the major powers to
behave very differently in the new century from the way they
behaved in the previous two centuries”.25
But another issue is also worth raising. It has been said that
the Russia-Ukraine conflict marks the return of traditional war
to the heart of Europe: but is this conflict really so “traditional”
and eccentric compared with the paradigm of “new wars”?
The current map of organised violence features a prevalence
of conflicts ‒ regardless of whether we call them post-national
wars, peoples’ wars, wars of the third kind, hybrid wars, fourthor fifth-generation wars, post-heroic
wars, post-modern wars or simply new wars ‒ fought in a global, multi-dimensional
context in which the war’s connection with the Clausewitzian
trinity of state, army and people has become decidedly loose,
in the sense that these conflicts involve the presence of nonstate actors, the blurring of the boundary between battlespace and non-battle space and the coordinated, simultaneous
use of a wide range of military and non-military instruments
(conventional weapons, irregular tactics, criminal acts, terrorism,
23 M. Rubboli, La guerra santa di Putin e Kirill, Chieti, Edizioni GBU, 2022. 24 I. Morris, War –
What Is It Good For?, 2014; cited by G. Breccia, La grande storia della guerra, Rome, Newton
Compton Editori, 2020, pp. 354-355. 25 J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001;
Italian translation La logica di potenza, Milan, Università Bocconi Editore, 2003, p. 328
52 Back to the Future
indiscriminate violence, highly sophisticated technology, classic
disinformation and propaganda techniques and acts of cyber,
communication, psycho-cognitive, economic, commercial and
financial war). If “hybrid warfare” is one of the most widely
used terms to describe the reality of today’s conflicts, this is
because those conflicts do not involve “fighting a single type
of war; instead, various categories (or ‘generations’) of wars
converge and develop simultaneously”.26
In this respect, the war in Ukraine is no exception. On
the one hand, it looks increasingly like countless past wars,
characterised by continuous, bloody confrontations that yield
no decisive victory to either party, but give rise only to a war
of attrition, whose outcome will be determined by the collapse
of the government, the economy or the will to fight, in one of
the warring countries. On the other hand, the Russia-Ukraine
war has other features ‒ including the presence of private and
semi-private entities (such as foreign fighters, Wagner Group
mercenaries and Chechen kadyrovcy), the extension of the
battlefield to the whole of Ukrainian society, recourse to a wide
range of non-conventional instruments (e.g. the weaponisation
of energy), large-scale use of drones and high-tech weapon
systems, and the increased importance of the cyber and cognitive
domains (hackering and psyops respectively) ‒ which are
entirely in line with the aforementioned predominant features
of contemporary conflicts. In certain respects, in fact, it could
be argued that the Russia-Ukraine conflict (with reference to
Ukraine more than Russia) is propelling us towards the future
and towards the next and final frontier of contemporary warfare:
the war to control the minds of the masses (not transiently or
partially, but semi-permanently and totally).
While the Gulf War of 1991 was the first conflict covered
in real time by TV cameras, and the Arab Spring saw the
first revolutions coordinated on social networks, Ukraine will
26 C. Jean, La strategia nelle guerre di quinta generazione, in L. Bozzo (editor),
Studi di strategia, Milan, EGEA, 2012, p. 59.
Are We Heading Back to an Age of Traditional Wars Between Major Powers?
53
certainly be remembered as the first theatre of war in which
the sixth dimension of conflict – the cognitive dimension –
played an equally (or more) important role as that of the other
five dimensions (land, sea, air, outer space and cyberspace),
by generating tangible, real-world effects. In fact, the RussiaUkraine war is “
the first conflict fought with weapons that
include memes, virtual appeals and advertising-style outputs
representing a cross between war propaganda and viral
marketing”.27 This unexpectedly and outstandingly effective mix
has enabled President Zelensky, the first online wartime leader, to
achieve two goals: firstly to generate such a vast “rallying effect”
around the Ukrainian flag as to encourage widespread, tenacious
civil resistance to Russian aggression; and secondly to awaken
the slumbering conscience of an uncertain West, to the point
of winning its firm and growing support (diplomatic, political,
economic and above all military) for the Ukrainian cause,
which in practice reversed an outcome (the rapid capitulation
of Kiev) that everyone (first and foremost Putin) had taken for
granted. In this respect, “while international relations will be
marked by a pre- and post-Ukraine demarcation line, hybrid
wars will be marked by a pre- and post-Zelensky demarcation
line”.28 Having studied the shrewd and unconstrained way
in which Zelensky has leveraged the technological advantage
afforded by the strategic use of digital platforms, Zhan Shi, a
Chinese analyst, came to describe the Russia-Ukraine war as
“the first metaverse war”: a “dispersed, digitised, interconnected
and smart” war that is being waged both online and offline
and makes “the Russian tactic, with its huge war machine,
comparable to that of the Second World War, look clumsy
and outdated”.29 But other aspects of the war in Ukraine also
appear to be steering us towards a future fraught with risks and
unknowns. Let us focus on just two of these. The first relates to
27 E. Pietrobon, Zelinskij. La storia dell’uomo che ha cambiato (per sempre) il modo di fare
la guerra, Rome, Castelvecchi, 2022, p. 74. 28 Ivi, back cover. 29 Z. Shi, “La prima guerra del Metaverso”, Limes, no. 4, 2022, p. 201.
54 Back to the Future
the process of democratisation (or apparent democratisation?)
unleashed by the systematic use of Open-Source Intelligence
resources, which has made the progress of field operations more
transparent and made “information that used to be held secretly
in the hands of governments, which decided how much of it to
disseminate, now largely available to anyone with an internet
connection”.30 The second relates to the prominent role played
by the aerospace capabilities of private actors such as Elon
Musk, who, by granting the Ukrainian armed forces free use
of Starlink, the satellite system of SpaceX, a global corporation
that he owns, has pushed the process of privatising war to the
extreme at which a private citizen can declare de facto war on
a nation, by choosing not merely to influence, but to actually
determine the outcome of, a conflict between sovereign states.
Conclusion
In light of the processes in international relations that the war
in Ukraine has set in motion (or revitalised) ‒ from a worrying
re-militarisation of relations between states to a growing
bipolarisation of the international system along the lines of
democracies versus autocracies, which nonetheless looks difficult
to reconcile with the tendency to form self-sufficient regional
resource and technology blocs, spawned by the “rethinking” of
globalisation that has received a fresh boost from the war ‒ it is
likely to be remembered as the real watershed event of the first
part of the XXI century. According to Françoise Heisbourg ‒
who as far back as 1997 wrote an ominous essay on the future
of war31 ‒ the Russia-Ukraine conflict, after the fall of the
Berlin Wall and the attacks of 11 September 2001, represents
“the third major historical watershed event of the past fifty
30 M. Spagnulo, “L’invisibile battaglia spaziale nella guerra d’Ucraina”, Limes, no.
7, 2022, p. 223.
31 F. Heisbourg, The Future of War, 1997; Italian translation Il futuro della guerra,
Milan, Garzanti, 1999, p. 23.
Are We Heading Back to an Age of Traditional Wars Between Major Powers?
55
years”, which posterity will see as the beginning of a new “era
of war”.32 Some even think that Putin’s decision to resolve the
“Ukrainian question” by force is “rapidly welding together
the parts of the creeping Third World War denounced by Pope
Francis”,33 bringing the world dangerously close to midnight
on the Doomsday Clock – all the more so if Russia’s threat to
use nuclear weapons materialises. Attempting to predict how
the situation will evolve, either in Ukraine or worldwide, is of
course a daunting task: there are too many variables to consider;
and too many “black swans” ‒ rare events of immense impact
that can only be seen coming with the benefit of hindsight –
have taken to the troubled waters of the post-bipolar world.
What is certain is that the post-modern illusion cherished
for decades by Europe, as a “civil power”, in the belief that
neighbouring regions (and eventually the entire international
system) could be reshaped and pacified on the basis of its own
experience, has been crushed (probably beyond repair) under
the overwhelming weight of the security dilemma and the
ruthless laws of power politics, which have exposed Europe’s
strategic vulnerabilities. As for the future of war, which now
“seems more dynamic and chameleon-like than ever before”,34
and the form that any global confrontation between the major
powers might take, Colin Gray notes that “it is a perennial
vice of unimaginative theorists to sketch out a future that is
identical to the present ‘but a bit more so’”, but “it is a parallel
mistake to predict a future that shares few points of contact
with reality as we know it”.35 So the words written by Edgar
Morin a few years ago sound more prescient than ever: “We’re
experiencing the beginning of a beginning”, so to understand
32 Id., “La Russia alla perdita dell’impero”, Aspenia, no. 99, 2002, pp. 136-137. 33 V. Ilari, “Perché l’indipendenza economica non impedisce la guerra”, Domino,
no. 4, 2022, p. 105.
34 M. Evans, “From Kadesh to Kandahar: Military Theory and the Future of
War”, Naval War College Review, vol. 56, no. 3, 2003, p. 132. 35 C.S. Gray, Another Bloody Century. Future Warfare, London, Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 2005, p. 21.
56 Back to the Future
the meaning and direction of the changes taking place, “we must
avoid dogmatism, in other words setting our ideas in stone and
refusing to measure them against experience”.36 If, however, we
cling to the belief that our theories and certainties are beyond
question, we risk ending up “like a penguin, drifting out to sea
on a melting bed of premises”.37
36 E. Morin, Penser global. L’homme et son univers, 2015; Italian translation Sette lezioni sul pensiero globale, Milan, Raffaello Cortina Editore, 2016, pp. 113-14. 37 E. Levenson, The Ambiguity of Change, 1983; Italian translation L’ambiguità del cambiamento, Rome, Astrolabio Ubaldini, 1985, p. 16
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