The Pandemic Is Providing Cover for ‘Opportunistic Repression’

 The Pandemic Is Providing Cover for ‘Opportunistic Repression’

Mel Pavlik 

Friday, Jan. 14, 2022

On Wednesday, Tunisia announced that it had restored its pandemic-era restrictions, imposing a 10 p.m. curfew and banning all gatherings for two weeks. According to President Kais Saied’s government, the decision was made in order to combat the recent, rapid spread of the coronavirus’s omicron variant. Yet the timing was suspect. It came merely two days before rival political parties were scheduled to lead a massive demonstration against Saied’s concentration of power in his own hands. The main opposition party, Ennahda, immediately promised to defy the ban and called for its supporters to demonstrate anyway. 

Tunisia is not an isolated case. Since the beginning of the pandemic, scholars have argued that COVID-19 policy responses could mask illiberal political agendas, especially in fragile democracies and autocracies. In the spring of 2020, government-mandated lockdown measures forced burgeoning protest movements in Iraq, Lebanon and a variety of other countries to either hit pause or disband. State security forces often enforced the bans by engaging in widescale violence against the protesters and civilians that defied them. Meanwhile, many “would-be autocrats” used the coronavirus pandemic as an excuse to increase their own influence by, for example, granting themselves sweeping emergency powers. 

Now, the spread of the omicron variant is forcing political leaders in democratic and authoritarian countries alike to reevaluate their policy options. In doing so, they will no doubt have to weigh a great many factors: the effectiveness of the various policies, their impact on physical and mental health, the population’s demographics and risk tolerance, broader economic factors and much else besides. But now, nearly two years into the pandemic, the time has come for leaders of democracies to consider something else: How will their decisions influence the policy choices of leaders in other countries?

There are many reasons to consider setting new and stronger public health policies at this stage of the pandemic, ranging from vaccination and mask-wearing mandates to potentially even strictly regulating or limiting access to public spaces. Each approach is potentially appropriate in different circumstances—and each will have effects that ripple beyond the domestic sphere. 

Political decisions made in democracies in response to global disasters shape the politics of other countries far beyond their jurisdictions. Early in the pandemic, the forceful imposition of temporary lockdowns and travel bans in democratic countries, sped along by granting executives emergency powers, made it easier for power-hungry leaders in less democratic states to do the same. Policymakers in the U.S. and across the West must acknowledge that their actions help to establish international norms and standards on responding to public health emergencies. And in this context, the decisions to go back into lockdown, ban gatherings, shutter schools or otherwise limit personal freedoms now in response to the omicron variant are ones that should not be taken lightly. 

Political decisions made in response to global disasters shape the politics of countries far beyond their jurisdictions.

Politics happens in public—in cafes, in parks and on the streets. Responses to the COVID-19 pandemic that prevent individuals from engaging with one another in public remove many of the stages on which democracy plays out. Town squares, theaters, markets and the like are important sites of political deliberation and debate, as well as social gathering. 

Even seemingly banal restrictions on institutions like coffeeshops threaten to have harmful consequences, especially in fragile democracies and authoritarian countries. For instance, many Middle Eastern countries—including Egypt—banned water pipes like shishas in cafes in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, because their shared use posed a risk of spreading of the virus. Many bars and cafes that relied on shishas for income have been shut down, depriving citizens of important community spaces. Restricting public space is also dangerous for those whose private lives entail constant fear and danger, such as victims of domestic violence.

There continues to be evidence that repressive governments are utilizing strict, allegedly public health-related messages to silence their domestic rivals. In a paper published this fall in International Security, my colleagues and I offered evidence that Uganda’s government, led by authoritarian President Yoweri Museveni, violently cracked down on opposition strongholds under the guise of enforcing legitimate public health measures. We called this “opportunistic repression”: when governments use the opportunities afforded by global crises to implement repressive measures that, at first glance, can seem proportional and justified to the international community. Uganda finally reopened its schools this week, bringing an end to the world’s longest school shutdown during the COVID-19 pandemic. But Museveni warned that they could close again if hospitals become overwhelmed. 

Indeed, bans on other large public gatherings—including street protests—have already been implemented in many countries in response to the omicron variant, including recently in the Netherlands. The de-facto legitimation of this policy may once again allow autocrats to hide their political repression and could soften the international community’s response to suspected human rights violations. In Tunisia’s case, for instance, to this author’s knowledge, neither the United Nations nor the U.S.—nor any other Western country—has officially responded to Saied’s new restrictions. 

In general, U.S. inaction in response to international repression has arguably emboldened would-be authoritarians. Throughout 2021, President Joe Biden and his team struggled to determine how they should react politically to repression, as governments around the globe were toppled by coups, fought back revolutions and threatened to invade neighboring countries. Despite the fanfare of Biden’s lofty Summit for Democracy, his actual track record has been mixed. And 2022 is likely to feature more such challenges, in addition to the dozens of upcoming elections worldwide in faltering democracies. By failing to respond to opportunistic repression, the West will only bolster autocrats’ sense of impunity. 

In the longer term, effective responses to anti-democratic behavior will need to start by understanding how illiberal governments legitimize their repression to the international community. For the U.S., that includes recognizing how its own national and subnational policies inadvertently empower authoritarians elsewhere. Even the most local policy decisions shape global norms. In the myriad of things that need be considered in this next stage of the pandemic, the U.S. and the international community should not lose sight of this reality.

Mel Pavlik is a guest columnist filling in for Candace Rondeaux every other Friday. She is a doctoral student in political science at Yale University, where she researches and writes on repression, political violence and international security. You can find her on Twitter at @mel_pavlik.

World Politics Review - January  14, 2022