Afghanistan–Tajikistan Border Clashes Pose a Dilemma for Moscow
While the fighting continues in Ukraine, Moscow will seek to avoid getting drawn into guaranteeing security on the long border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan.
A new escalation is under way on the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan following a series of attacks in which Dushanbe claims Afghan fighters targeted a joint Chinese–Tajik gold mine, killing five Chinese nationals. Beijing subsequently advised all its nationals to leave the border area, demanded Tajikistan strengthen its defenses, and called on Afghanistan to investigate the incidents.
In the wake of the attacks, Reuters news agency quoted sources in Tajikistan who said the country was asking Moscow to deploy troops—either under the remit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) or from Russia’s 201st military base in Tajikistan—to carry out joint border patrols. Even though Reuters subsequently deleted its article because of “insufficient evidence,” the situation remains a problematic one for Moscow. At stake is Russia’s role as a regional security guarantor.
Despite having a weak army and a long border with Afghanistan, Tajikistan rushed to position itself as the main adversary of the Taliban regime that came to power in 2021. While Uzbekistan forged a working relationship with Kabul, and Russia became the first (and so far only) country in the world to establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban, Dushanbe demonstratively refused to engage.
Tajikistan even backed the remnants of Afghan opposition forces, and remains the only country in the region not to allow the Taliban to use the Afghan embassy. Confrontational rhetoric has been accompanied by muscle flexing, with military parades on the border, and checks of the readiness of the country’s reservists.
Initially, Dushanbe’s casting of itself as the irreconcilable enemy of the Taliban generated domestic and foreign policy dividends. After the Taliban seized power, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon visited Brussels and Paris, where he was promised support for border security.
Inside Tajikistan, there was a surge of tub-thumping patriotism, with people rallying around the regime as it doubled down on claims it was trying to protect the rights of ethnic Tajiks inside Afghanistan. Dushanbe’s confidence was underwritten by its close security ties with the region’s major powers: Russia, India, and China.
Perhaps inevitably, though, the hardline position vis-à-vis Afghanistan became harder for Dushanbe to sustain. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan’s borders have generally remained relatively calm—except for the border with Tajikistan. In the first half of 2025 alone, there were more than ten incidents.
If these attacks had happened immediately after the Taliban came to power four years ago, it would have been more politically convenient for Dushanbe: it would have proved that the Tajik government’s hostile attitude to the Taliban was justified. But the circumstances are different now, and the escalation comes amid attempts by Dushanbe to improve relations with Kabul.
The most important difference is the ongoing war in Ukraine, which has altered Moscow’s priorities. Russia has concentrated almost all its military force in Ukraine, including men from the 201st military base in Tajikistan (according to media reports, the number of soldiers stationed at the base has fallen by at least a fifth).
In addition, this year, India gave up its Ayni air base in Tajikistan after New Delhi decided a presence in Central Asia was not a strategic priority. Tajikistan tried to compensate for India’s exit by deepening its cooperation with Pakistan and Iran—but has only been partially successful.
The second major difference is the West’s rethink of its approach to Afghanistan. The European Union, for example, which is preoccupied by the Russia–Ukraine war, has less time for Afghanistan, and has accordingly resorted to a pragmatic relationship with the Taliban. Notably, predictions that the Taliban’s seizure of power would lead to a rise in global terrorism have not come to pass.
As a result of the shifting circumstances, Dushanbe has gradually softened its position toward the Taliban. In the middle of November, there were media reports of a visit by senior Tajik officials to Afghanistan, and a Taliban delegation was hosted in Tajikistan’s Badakhshan region. In addition, Tajikistan handed over control to the Taliban of the Afghan consulate in Khorog, sent humanitarian aid, and has continued supplying electricity despite Afghanistan’s debts.
These diplomatic contacts helped resolve some of the problems caused by the attacks at the border, but the conversations have not been easy. After an incident in the summer, for example, a meeting between the two sides descended into an acrimonious exchange.
The most recent attacks have not been local clashes, but serious strikes—sometimes involving drones—on sensitive facilities (mostly Chinese-owned). The first more significant attack took place in November 2024 in Tajikistan’s southern Shamsiddin Shohin district. The most recent one, which resulted in five deaths, took place this November in both Shamsiddin Shohin and the village of Shodaki. Initially, the Tajik government chose to remain silent about the attacks, but when they became more frequent over the summer of 2025, they became impossible to hide.
It’s not entirely clear who is responsible. Hypothetically, it could be the Eastern Turkestan Islamist Movement (which China designates as a terrorist organization), or Afghanistan’s Islamic State–Khorasan Province. However, neither group has claimed responsibility. It’s also possible the Taliban carried them out to annoy unfriendly Tajikistan by trying to compromise the latter’s relationship with Beijing. However, it’s unlikely the Taliban would risk its own relationship with China—almost the only country that has the desire and capacity to invest in Afghanistan.
The most likely explanation, therefore, is that the attacks were not coordinated by one actor. After all, the Taliban do not have full control of northern Afghanistan, and much of the process of government is outsourced to warlords. When local, cross-border agreements break down, it’s easy to imagine injured parties reaching for their weapons. This is what happened in August when Taliban and Tajik border guards in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan region clashed over changes to the course of the Panj River (marking the Afghanistan–Tajikistan border).
Nor is it surprising that Chinese facilities have been attacked. Almost all the infrastructure—as well as mining operations—in remote parts of Tajikistan is built and run by Chinese companies. In other words, there are few targets in this part of the world unconnected to China.
Amid all this, a stir was caused by the Reuters report that cited Tajik sources as claiming that Dushanbe had asked Moscow to deploy troops to the Tajikistan–Afghanistan border. In some ways, this shouldn’t have been surprising. After all, Russia and Tajikistan are military allies, and the 201st military base is Moscow’s biggest military base outside of Russia. In addition, Russian forces were involved in guarding Tajikistan’s Afghan border until 2005 (this was particularly important during the period of Tajikistan’s civil war between 1992 and 1997).
Although Reuters ultimately withdrew the article and the Tajik authorities said the reporting did not reflect reality, it’s unlikely to be completely without foundation. The most likely explanation is that it was a reflection of one faction within the Tajik leadership that did want to see a Russian intervention to resolve the border crisis.
Whatever really happened, Moscow now has few good options. On the one hand, an appeal for Russian help to protect Chinese infrastructure (despite the fact that China has two police outposts in Tajikistan) highlights Moscow’s continuing influence in the region. On the other, the deployment of a Russian military force would entail serious risks.
If Russian soldiers were sent to the border and proved unable to stop the attacks, it would fuel the narrative that Russia has been weakened by the Ukraine war. And if Russian soldiers were killed, it would put Moscow in a bind—given that it has recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, and called on other countries to do the same.
Nor should one forget about Russia’s domestic situation. Sending soldiers to Tajikistan while the fighting continues in Ukraine might be seen by many inside Russia as a waste of resources—even treachery. Ultra-patriotic groups regularly accuse the Russian leadership of wasting money, time, and resources on “ungrateful allies,” and military aid for Tajikistan—particularly given the anti-migrant rhetoric that is currently extremely common in Russia—would risk sparking opposition.
Consequently, Moscow will likely try to limit its involvement. It’s possible some soldiers from the 201st base will be sent to a secure and peaceful part of the border. Or, to save face, Russia might conduct some joint military exercises with Tajikistan.
What the Kremlin will certainly seek to avoid is involving any troops in joint patrols on dangerous stretches of the border. Such patrols would allow Dushanbe to retain its influence in these areas—including over local economic activity—while shifting all the financial burden for the current situation, as well as the considerable military and political risks, onto Russia’s shoulders.
No comments:
Post a Comment