The only way around Hamas is to offer a plan for temporary joint-Arab governance of the Gaza Strip under a revitalized Palestinian Authority.
Israel’s war in Gaza has reached a strategic dead end. In recent months, Israel has had phenomenal success in setting back Iran’s nuclear program by up to two years (with significant American help) and demolishing the threat posed by Hezbollah from Lebanon. By contrast, the results of Israel’s 22-month fight in Gaza are abysmal even by the stated objectives of the Israeli government. There are no signs of an imminent Hamas collapse; on the contrary, although the IDF is said to have gained control of 75 percent of Gaza’s territory, a recent INSS assessment asserts that half of Gaza’s population is currently concentrated in areas still controlled by Hamas. The same assessment also asserts that Hamas continues to hijack “most” of the humanitarian aid entering Gaza.
Moreover, the limited success that Israel has had so far in Gaza was associated with horrific death and destruction, with Palestinian casualties (estimated by Hamas’ Ministry of Health) reaching some 60,000 dead and at least that number wounded. The magnitude of the physical damage caused is also unimaginable, with entire towns such as Rafah and Khan Junis flattened, producing scenes reminiscent of Russia’s destruction of Chechnya. By late July, numerous Western media channels reported deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Gaza, including considerable hunger. Finally, in separate reports, two Israeli human rights NGOs and David Grossman, one of Israel’s most gifted writers, have recently described Israel’s conduct in Gaza as genocide.
The effect of these developments on Israel’s standing in international public opinion and the reaction of various governments to the changes in public mood—including in countries with long-standing records of supporting the Jewish state—has been devastating. This is especially the case within the European Union, some of whose members have considered suspending Israel’s participation in its flagship Horizon Europe grant program, a key source of funding for scientific research and technological innovation. In addition, by the third week of July, a growing number of European governments, led by France, have threatened to recognize Palestinian statehood unilaterally and thus unconditionally.
These developments have had two very serious negative implications for Israel’s confrontation with Hamas: First, Israel’s attempts to coerce Hamas to accept a ceasefire and hostage release deal on its terms by threatening to extract additional heavy costs from Gaza’s population have been ineffective, as Gaza seemed to have already suffered the worst. Not surprisingly, therefore, Hamas was clearly unmoved when Israel’s defense minister, Israel Katz, promised repeatedly that the “gates of hell” would open should the terror organization continue to resist any deal that Israel can accept. Aside from failing to give credit to President Trump, who was the first to use this expression, Katz seemed oblivious to the problem associated with issuing such threats in an arena where the “gates of hell” had already opened some 22 months ago.
Moreover, the recent very negative international reactions to Israel’s coercive measures seem to have led Hamas to conclude that time is on its side. Consequently, Hamas seems to have hardened its positions further, especially in the negotiations of a ceasefire and hostage release deal. Not surprisingly, in a bellicose speech delivered on July 27, Hamas’ current leader, Khalil al-Hayya, seemed to be inviting Israel to experience the consequences of entering “the gates of hell.” Thus, al-Hayya’s speech should have clarified to Israelis that in arenas of coercive diplomacy, it is exceedingly difficult to overcome an adversary who believes that his demands will soon be met if only he would continue to “hang in there” for just a while longer.
In that case, what are Israel’s options for escaping its current strategic predicament? The leaders of Israel’s right-wing parties, such as Bezalel Smotrich, Itamar Ben Gvir, and Orit Struck, are pressing for a massive military offensive to defeat Hamas, conquer Gaza, and rebuild the Israeli settlements that Israel demolished before it withdrew unilaterally from Gaza in the summer of 2005. If there was any doubt about the aspirations of these leaders, along came Minister of Jewish Heritage Amichai Eliahu and confessed that the Israeli government was “rushing toward Gaza being wiped out.”
Two former senior IDF officers recently suggested a more benign version of this option. The option proposed is to complete Gaza’s conquest and impose a temporary Israeli military government on its population, in the hope that this would also result in the release of Israeli hostages. A major problem with this proposal is that it cannot escape the suspicion that it is intended to serve as a camouflage for Ben Gvir-Smotrich’s desired outcome in Gaza.
Regardless, no such variation should be regarded as even remotely feasible given Israel’s growing dependence on the United States and given that President Trump has already clarified how he feels about the death, destruction, and hunger associated with a continuation of the fighting. Indeed, to date, all efforts—well-intentioned as they may have been—to mitigate the inevitable consequences of war by suggesting such oxymorons as a wartime “humanitarian city,” “willful expulsion,” and protected “population concentration” that, surprise, surprise, reminded readers and listeners of the Holocaust, cannot hold water.
Under the circumstances described here, the only way to address the current dead-end is to abandon efforts to reach a ceasefire and hostage release deal with Hamas. Nearly two years of failed efforts to reach such an agreement should have persuaded us by now of the futility of trying to reach such a deal. Instead, the United States should sponsor negotiations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and the key signatories to the Abraham Accords, on the terms and conditions for replacing Hamas with the security forces and governing institutions of a reinvented and enhanced Palestinian Authority (PA).
The suggested agreement should stipulate a transition period during which the participating Arab countries would enter Gaza, compel Hamas to immediately release all Israeli hostages, and replace Hamas as Gaza’s temporary governors. The negotiated agreement would cover the duration of the transition period; steps toward Palestinian self-determination in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem that Israel would need to accept; and, security measures that would be implemented to ensure the safety of Israelis during and after the transition, when the Arab states’ presence would be gradually replaced by a “new and improved” PA.
The architecture of such a new regional security regime that would stabilize Gaza as a corridor to Israeli-Palestinian peace was presented a few months ago in a document detailing the proposed regime’s main components, the details of the transition period, the likely impediments to the implementation, and the means of overcoming these impediments.
About the Author: Shai Feldman
Shai Feldman is the Raymond Frankel Chair in Israeli Politics and Society at Brandeis University’s Crown Center for Middle East Studies.
Image: Ran Zisovitch / Shutterstoc
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