A senior Israeli official told Western media on July 10 that Iran did not move its enriched uranium stockpile from the Fordow, Natanz, or Esfahan nuclear sites ahead of the US and Israeli strikes on the sites. The official told Reuters that Iran has not moved the material since the strikes either. Israeli sources stated on June 25 that US and Israeli strikes buried Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile under rubble. Israeli strikes on June 13 damaged the Fuel Plate Manufacturing Plant (FPFP) at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, which stored approximately 85 percent of Iran’s 20 percent enriched uranium stockpile and 83 percent of Iran’s 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile as of August 2023. It is unclear how much, if any, of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile was at FPFP at the time of US and Israeli strikes. Reuters reported that Iran could gain access to the Esfahan site, but that it will be difficult to remove any of the material stored at the site, according to the senior Israeli official. The New York Times similarly reported on July 10 that the storage facility at the Esfahan site was too deep to be effectively destroyed, but US and Israeli strikes made it significantly harder to access the material by targeting tunnel entrances, according to a senior Israeli official. Uranium is an element, which means that you cannot destroy it with conventional weapons, only scatter it or pulverize it into dust. The Israeli official said that Israel believes Iran stored additional stockpiles at Fordow and Natanz but that these will be too difficult to recover following US and Israeli strikes. The US and Israeli strikes on Fordow and other enrichment facilities could have buried enriched uranium underground to limit access to it. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated that Iran cannot access certain key nuclear facilities to accurately assess the damage. Iran's enriched uranium stockpile is effectively inaccessible, assuming that Iran did not move the material and cannot access the facilities it is stored. Senior Israeli intelligence officials said that any Iranian attempts to recover the material would "almost certainly" be detected.
Iranian reformists and hardliners are in disagreement over Iran’s policy on nuclear negotiations and US-Iran relations following the 12-day Israel-Iran War. Reformist newspaper Ham Mihan published an editorial on July 9 and warned that public threats against foreign leaders, including US President Donald Trump, risk provoking US retaliation. The outlet explicitly addressed Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei and criticized judicial “double standards” for prosecuting “minor dissent” while ignoring calls to assassinate Trump. The outlet also cited Trump’s 2023 assassination attempt and warned that similar incidents could justify US retaliation “regardless of Iranian denials.”
These reformists' comments come after senior Iranian clerics issued a fatwa on June 30 that declared Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “mohareb” (enemies of God) and called for their killing. Some clerics and organizations even offered monetary rewards and solicited public donations for the assassinations. Assembly of Experts member Mohsen Araki defended the fatwa and stated that threats to Khamenei amount to “war against the Islamic world” and similarly labeled US and Israeli leaders as “mohareb.” Twenty-four Iranian parliamentarians, including ultraconservative Paydari (Stability) Front members, criticized President Masoud Pezeshkian’s interview with Tucker Carlson on July 6 and accused him of undermining national unity in a July 10 letter. They also criticized Pezeshkian for failing to endorse recent clerical fatwas against Trump and Netanyahu.
The post-war environment has demonstrated Iran’s internal divisions as hardliners and media linked to the military rejected nuclear talks while moderates pushed for de-escalation with the United States. The Iranian parliamentarians criticized Pezeshkian’s call for renewed talks with the United States and resuming cooperation with the IAEA as “disappointing.” They warned that expressing willingness to negotiate sends a “message of weakness” to the United States, which could ”embolden the US to impose more sanctions or launch another military strike.” Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media separately outlined preconditions on July 10 that amount to a rejection of renewed US-Iran talks. The preconditions include recognition of Israeli aggression, investigation of US involvement, payment of war reparations, and binding security guarantees to prevent future attacks. The outlet warned that talks without these demands would ”legitimize past attacks“ and encourage future ones. Hardliners are effectively rejecting negotiations unless they occur on a maximalist basis that addresses Iranian demands in full. The United States has shown absolutely no inclination towards addressing any maximalist Iranian demands, especially these preconditions that go far beyond previous negotiation frameworks. Hardliner demands contrast with efforts by moderate figures, including former President Hassan Rouhani, to push for de-escalation. Rouhani has lobbied senior clerics in Qom to pressure Khamenei into accepting a ceasefire and halting uranium enrichment, framing these moves as necessary to “save the Islamic system from collapse.”
Israeli airstrikes targeting Houthi-controlled Hudaydah Port since May 2025 have rendered several berths at the port inoperable. Satellite imagery also demonstrates that the Houthis have only a limited ability to repair the damage that the berths have sustained. Israeli airstrikes since May 2025 have badly damaged six of Hudaydah port’s seven main berths. Berth seven has not been regularly used since before the strikes began on May 5, according to Starboard Maritime Intelligence, indicating that Israeli airstrikes destroyed it. Satellite imagery shows that the most recent strike on July 6 was the most destructive, causing significant damage to berths two, three, and four, as well as additional damage between berths six and seven. The July 6 damage to berths two, three, and four appears to be more significant than the damage that berth seven suffered in early May.
The Houthis repaired some earlier damage to the port facilities in June during a lull in Israeli strikes, but did not repair the more significant damage to berths one, five, and seven. The Houthis were unable to repair some of the more significant damage within the two months between May and July 2025. The Houthis would presumably repair these facilities if they could do so rapidly. The Houthi inability to repair the berths between May and July does not, on its own, indicate that the berths are permanently destroyed.
The combination of Israeli operations against Iranian military leadership and an Israeli strike targeting a senior Iranian-backed Iraqi militia commander on the Iraq-Iran border may have created shock among Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that disrupted their plans to attack US forces in Iraq. An Israeli airstrike killed a senior member of Iranian-backed Iraq militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada (KSS) on the Iran-Iraq border on June 21. The senior militiaman was on the border while KSS had already planned to transfer weapons, including drones, from Iran to Iraq to attack US forces. A Kurdish journalist close to the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) said on June 28 that the strike caused militia commanders to “panic” and cancel pre-planned attacks on US forces. This “panic“ suggests that the methodical Israeli campaign that killed many top Iranian military commanders, combined with the death of the senior KSS member on a presumably confidential mission, created shock within the militia ranks and caused them to cancel the attacks.
KSS leader Abu Alaa al Walai had previously threatened on June 11 to attack US forces if the United States participated in the Israeli air campaign. Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including KSS, announced on June 17 that they had developed a “joint plan” to target US forces if the United States joined the Israeli air campaign against Iran.
The plans to attack US forces, which would presumably have been previously communicated to militia attack cells, probably contributed to unclaimed but likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting US forces in Iraq since June 12. Militia commanders would have needed to communicate basic attack plans to their cells throughout Iraq and provide them with weapons to conduct the attacks. Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted multiple one-way drone attacks targeting US positions across Iraq between June 12 and 24. The militias may have suffered from a lack of discipline among the rank-and-file fighters who attempted to independently launch drone attacks targeting US forces in Iraq. Mid-level militia leadership may have also allowed fighters to conduct attacks without publicly sanctioning them.
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