CEPA ( Center for European Policy Analysis)
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The Implications for Global Governance of China and Russia’s Post-2022 Alignment
The political alignment of China and Russia is best defined as a friendship rather than a classical alliance.
By Evgeny Roshchin
June 23, 2025
Contents
Executive Summary
Introduction
Changing Perspective: Forging a Friendship Instead of an Alliance
China-Russia Alignment and the United Nations
China-Russia alignment and BRICS
Conclusions
About the Author
Acknowledgments
Executive Summary
The political alignment of China and Russia is best defined as a friendship rather than a classical alliance. While they are committed to coordinating and supporting each other, the relationship does not entail the strict obligations of an alliance
There is an established imbalance in the friendship, with Russia often being seen as the Junior partner in the relationship. In the global arena, the countries act as free agents, taking independent action and occasionally expressing divergent opinions. This allows them to test institutional rules and norms as well as world public opinion, and distance themselves from the other if necessary.
The two countries emphasize multipolarity and the United Nations in their global governance strategies. However, Beijing and Moscow have different understandings of the way the system of global governance should evolve, and different priorities for international organizations and their various bodies.
While both countries voice their priorities at the UN Security Council (UNSC), they pursue differing regional policies. In Africa, Russia’s goals are narrowly protectionist of national governments, while China’s policies, which reflect its global ambition and commitment to institutions, promote development and international cooperation. Beijing and Moscow also hold significantly different views on UN reform.
Since 2022, Russia and China have transformed the role of the BRICS countries in the global arena, using its expansion to indirectly improve their own international standing. The group expanded membership and increased cooperation across policy domains, utilizing the tactics of logrolling to trade support for policy advancement.
Introduction
This brief analyzes the alignment of China and Russia and the impact of 2022’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on their relationship and the system of global governance. The first section assesses the general state of China-Russia relations and the second examines whether this political engagement impacts the two states’ policies at the UN and their visions of the organization. The third section traces the recent transformations of BRICS as a result of Chinese and Russian efforts.
This paper analyzes the alignment between China and Russia, focusing on Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine’s impact on their relationship and the broader system of global governance.
Photo: Vladimir Putin receiving the Chinese Order of Friendship by the President of Russia under CC BY 4.0.
It is organized into three sections. The first defines and outlines the expectations of the China-Russia political “friendship”. The cooperative relationship that they uphold encourages bilateral trade, symbolic gestures, regular diplomatic engagement, and a proclaimed “friendship with no limits”. However, many aspects of their relationship remain unclear to the international community leading to mixed conclusions, an inability to measure their cooperation, and an insufficient understanding of the implications that their alignment poses to global affairs. Their reluctance to form an official alliance suggests a shared desire to maintain strategic autonomy while still coordinating efforts on the international stage. Nonetheless, this friendship has ensured their international influence and their ability to pursue their political and economic objectives.
The second section examines how the Russia-China alignment shapes their relationship with the United Nations, while also pointing out key differences in political positions they have with respect to the UN, Western liberal democracies, and broader strategic priorities. Despite their frequent coordination, their approaches to issues such as the Russia-Ukraine war, Africa, and UN reform often diverge, limiting the depth, cohesion, and international standing of their partnership. Being UN Security Council members, China and Russia maintain significant power over policies in the UN and together they are able to pursue their international political agendas.
The last section focuses primarily on recent efforts of Beijing and Moscow to transform BRICS. In recent years the two countries spearheaded the expansion of the international organization to bolster BRICS’s global recognition and also advance their own geopolitical agendas. While the UN Security Council still provides an opportunity for them to influence global affairs, BRICS is becoming another method of leverage that will likely impact the actions and dynamics of the UNSC, the future of their political friendship, and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.
Changing Perspective: Forging a Friendship Instead of an Alliance
While many observers struggle to define the China-Russia alignment as an alliance or a patron-client relationship, the best definition is offered by the two states themselves — it is a good old political friendship. This type of relationship does not require perfect alignment or automatic coordination, but it does entail a notable increase in attentiveness to one another’s priorities —particularly actions with the potential to affect the other’s global standing. This increased coordination goes well beyond the diplomatic engagement either country maintains with other partners, outside the circle of their satellites, while leaving room for divergence of opinion and even some distrust.
Beijing and Moscow have both declared their commitment to the UN-centered global order and an intent to cooperate across global platforms. This cooperation is framed by the proclaimed friendship of the two nations and implies coordination at the UN, the UN Security Council, BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.1 This report investigates the way such framing has impacted their cooperation since 2022, while stressing the limits political friendship can sustain.2
Photo: Chinese President Xi Jinping walks past Russian honour guards during a welcoming ceremony upon his arrival at Moscow’s Vnukovo airport, Russia July 3, 2017. Credit: REUTERS/Sergei Karpukhin
China-Russia relations received an important boost with the signing of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2001 — an early and strategic investment by the newly elected Russian President Vladimir Putin. Since then, each side has stressed distinct aspects of friendship to avoid the undesirable connotations of this political relationship, including possible inequality and domination.3 In the weeks leading up to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the two countries elevated their political ties to a “friendship with no limits.”4
This identification has not been taken seriously by observers, who attempt instead to conceptualize the relationship in terms of alliance or dependency. Chinese officials did their part to add to the confusion, sometimes dismissing the “no limits” language as purely rhetorical.5 As a result, observers sought to argue Russia is no longer a global contender, and is becoming China’s junior partner.6 The logic of describing it as a China-Russia alliance presumes the goal of balancing the US-led Western alliance — primarily to protect their domestic regimes.7 Yet many found the nature of this “alliance” perplexing, characterizing it as the pursuit of self-interest through parallel actions rather than coordinated strategies.8
Photo: People are welcoming the Chinese frigate Yantai at Yantai Port in Yantai, China, on April 19, 2024. Credit: Cfoto/NurPhoto
Measuring the institutionalization of the relationship yields similarly mixed conclusions about its political nature.9 Research has noted that relations between the two countries intensified in the second half of the 2000s, and were marked by more frequent visits, summits, consultations, and vote convergence at the UN.10 Other observers argue that the degree of engagement reached a “high” or “enhanced” level already in the 2010s. Having achieved this level, relations did not grow exponentially, even after the 2014 annexation of Crimea.11 Such approaches to analysis are limited to stating the obvious, that the two countries intensified their relations over the years, stopping short of a formal alliance.12
Making sense of the alignment at such an enhanced level of engagement requires a shifting of definitions, paying attention to symbolic gestures and the dos and don’ts of the relationship. Since 2022, Russia has increasingly turned to China as its closest friend, principal trading partner, and strategic neighbor. In the context of Moscow’s deepening isolation, Chinese support has served as a means for it to preserve its international status. Currently, both states are heavily invested in this bilateral friendship, scaling up high-level diplomatic contacts to pre-pandemic levels. This includes personal meetings between presidents Putin and Xi Jinping, making Russia the most visited country for the latter. Xi visited Moscow for the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe in May 2025, allowing the Kremlin to present the celebrations as a major diplomatic event.
Political friendship between China and Russia means prioritizing the concerns of the other party, public gestures of goodwill, and willingness to coordinate on key global issues. These attitudes show themselves in the way both countries manage global public opinion, trying not to undermine each other’s efforts, and have developed most conspicuously in the context of hosting mega-events, which both countries understand as status projection vehicles. In 2008, China held its first Olympic Games, an event of great significance for the country, and Russia invaded Georgia on the opening day. The message of displeasure from Beijing that followed was clear — and the lesson likely absorbed. When Russia annexed Crimea in February 2014, it waited until the Sochi Olympics ended, and President Xi had left the country. Similarly, the 2022 invasion of Ukraine did not begin until the Beijing Winter Games closed on February 20. These timelines point to the possibility of diplomatic coordination.13
Photo: A woman walks past the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympic logo at an installation featuring National Speed Skating Oval, in Beijing, China January 18, 2022. Credit: REUTERS/Carlos Garcia Rawlins
Signals and gestures during Russia’s war with Ukraine have become matters of strategic importance. For instance, in February 2025, after US President Donald Trump’s early initiative to negotiate a ceasefire in Ukraine, Putin held a call with Xi, updating him on the negotiations and receiving confirmation of China’s commitment to the relationship. Later, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explicitly dismissed “speculation” about Russia pivoting away from the East because of the alleged euphoria over renewed Russia-US dialogue.14 In this context, Russia demonstrated receptiveness to political requests from China. Similarly, when Beijing asked Moscow to de-escalate its nuclear rhetoric in 2023, Russian officials softened their messaging.15
As friends, Russia and China have made statements in opposition to non-UN sanctions, Trump’s pressure strategy on Iran and his “Golden Dome” defense project.16 However, joint declarations need not synchronize with joint action. Russia’s military actions have done little to help China build international prestige, particularly through the UNSC, which has become virtually ineffective. Moreover, Russia has declined some Chinese proposals, such as the 2024 China-Brazil peace initiative for Ukraine. The freedom to pursue an independent course of action is a key advantage of political friendship, but it is also an important limitation to unity between the two states and the influence they can exert on each other.
China-Russia Alignment and the United Nations
While proselytizing multipolarity, both China and Russia have remained consistent in their commitment to the UN-based system (a commitment reiterated during Xi’s visit to Moscow in May 2025). Although the two emphasize different forms of engagement with the UN, this has been the strategic line. Diplomats from both countries take pleasure in attacking the Western neologism “rules-based order,” implying that these “rules” extend beyond the UN Charter and serve only those who created them. Yet neither state has indicated any desire to depart from the UN’s own loose system of rules.
Photo: Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, (on screen) addresses the Security Council Meeting on Maintenance of Peace and Security of Ukraine. Credit: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe
The difference lies in Russia’s diminished enthusiasm for the UN following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the use of UN institutions by other states to articulate condemnation of the war and Moscow’s broader conduct. As a result, Russia’s focus has narrowed to the work of the UNSC. China’s priorities and interests in the UN are more comprehensive, and its willingness to participate in the full spectrum of UN institutions is greater. Moreover, China actively promotes the work of the UN, for example initiating a dispute with the US in the World Trade Organization over additional duties imposed on Chinese goods by Trump in April 2025.17
The friendship between the two states has a strong impact on their voting patterns at the UN. In most cases, this voting is perfectly aligned, though there are important areas of divergence that highlight the limits of friendship and discrepancies in strategic priorities. Below are three areas at the UN where China and Russia diverge, and where their friendship has less bearing on their BRICS allies.
The UN and the War in Ukraine
The key test for China and Russia’s friendship came immediately after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. At the time, four BRICS members were on the UNSC – China and Russia (permanent), and Brazil and India (non-permanent). Russia was alone in voting against, and as a result vetoing, resolutions concerning the war. For instance, Russia vetoed draft resolution S/2022/160 in February 2022 on convening an emergency special session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), while China and India abstained. Brazil supported the resolution.
Photo: The Security Council votes on a draft resolution during the meeting on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question. A view of Vassily Nebenzia, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, voting against the resolution. Credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías https://dam.media.un.org/CS.aspx?VP3=DamView&VBID=2AM94SCIHKJ
A Brazilian representative said: “A line has been crossed and the Council cannot remain silent.”18 The Hindu, an influential Indian newspaper, also rejected Russia’s narrative as imperialist and dismissed its claims about a Nazi regime in Kyiv as false. It said the Indian government should urge Russia to observe the 2021 BRICS New Delhi Resolution, which affirmed the inadmissibility of using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.19 In September 2022, Russia was again the only permanent member to veto draft resolution S/2022/720, condemning Russia’s referendums in the occupied territories and violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, proposed by Albania and the US. This time, the other BRICS members of the UNSC – China, Brazil, and India – all abstained.
These voting results underscored the lack of support for Russia’s invasion and the limits of its ability to leverage friendships on the global stage. It managed to secure favorable votes from a few of its satellite states and allies in the UNGA – Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, and Syria voted with Russia against the draft UNGA resolution condemning the invasion and calling for an end to Russia’s unlawful use of force. India abstained, while Brazil voted in favor.
Photo: Men dig graves for victims of a Russian missile attack, amid Russia’s ongoing attack on Ukraine, at the village cemetery in Hroza, near Kharkiv, Ukraine, October 9, 2023. Credit: REUTERS/Thomas Peter
Previous research has shown that the China-Russia alignment and the BRICS alignment are usually reflected in voting patterns at UNGA, but BRICS countries have refrained from offering even symbolic support to Russia for the war in Ukraine.20 Since 2022, China has abstained on UNGA resolutions condemning Russia’s aggression, even when, in 2025, the US voted against such a resolution. China’s UN mission has consistently explained that it advocates for the restoration of peace, and at no point has it expressed support for Russia’s policy towards Ukraine. Chinese ambassadors to the UN have repeatedly said that, while “the legitimate security concerns of all countries must be taken seriously,” the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states must be respected. 21
Moscow’s BRICS leverage has also appeared limited in the UN Human Rights Council, which adopted Resolution A/HRC/RES/51/25 appointing a special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Russia. The rapporteur has since produced two annual reports documenting the deterioration of human rights protections in the country. Brazil and India abstained on the resolution, while China voted against, in line with its commitment to the principle of non-interference in the domestic political affairs of states.
UNSC Voting and Africa Policies
Both China and Russia regard their permanent seats on the UNSC as central to their global roles. For the Kremlin, this status has become part of the state ideology and it is used to uphold the legacy of victory in World War II and justify its ambition to shape global affairs. Both states use UNSC votes to project their perspectives on contemporary international issues and governance more broadly. In recent years, Since 2000s, their voting alignment has been nearly complete — whether in support of resolutions or expressing discontent with specific framings through abstention. This pattern has remained unchanged since 2022. They even jointly vetoed several resolutions, although China, unlike Russia, is more restrained in wielding its veto power. They vetoed a US resolution on North Korea in 2022, and US-sponsored resolutions on Gaza in 2023 and 2024. This pattern illustrates a significant level of diplomatic coordination in asserting the two states’ global aspirations.
While coordination is strong, important divergences in voting have occurred. Closer scrutiny of these instances reveals nuance in Moscow and Beijing’s positions that reflects distinct strategic and normative concerns. Most are related to Africa and reflect both countries’ interest in expanding their influence on the continent. The voting on resolutions on Mali, Somalia and Sudan illustrates the issues on which the two states diverge.
Photo: Well wishers wear T-shirts with pictures of Presidents Xi Jingpin and Macky Sall printed on them before Xi Jingpin’s arrival at the Leopold Sedar Senghor International Airport at the start of his visit to Dakar, Senegal July 21, 2018. Credit: REUTERS/Mikal McAllister
In its efforts to win support among African states, Russia has used “protectionist” logic to shield its “allies” from international scrutiny. 22 In August 2023, for example, it vetoed a draft resolution on the situation in Mali (S/2023/638). The resolution proposed maintaining the sanctions regime and renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts, a UN mechanism supporting peace efforts. Moscow objected, citing the demand of the Malian government, which was actively collaborating with Russian Wagner Group mercenaries. China abstained and Brazil voted in favor of the resolution.
China’s position often echoes Russia’s stance toward African states, emphasizing non-interference and the importance of national sovereignty. But China also seems to expect more from governments and insists on a greater role for the African Union (AU) in regional crises. On several Somalia-related resolutions the two states voted similarly, but in October 2022 diverged when China abstained and Russia voted in favor of Resolution 2657, which extended the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia’s mandate. The Chinese representative said Beijing wished to see more effort by the Somali government in capacity building to enhance humanitarian action, protect vulnerable populations, and manage weapons. The Russian representative, speaking after China, briefly acknowledged the humanitarian dimension but avoided discussion of governance. This example also pointed to a difference in the way the two states approach climate adaptation: while Russia occasionally notes climate impacts, China elevates the issue, blaming developed countries for insufficient financial contributions, as it did during discussion of the Secretary-General’s report on Somalia in 2023.23
Photo: Thousands of anti-sanctions protestors holding Nigerien flags and Russian flags gather in support of the putschist soldiers in the capital Niamey, Niger August 20, 2023. Credit: REUTERS/Mahamadou Hamidou
Several Sudan-related resolutions further illustrate the logic pursued by both states. In 2023, Russia abstained on a resolution to terminate the UN mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), while China supported the Sudanese government’s request to end the mission, underscoring its belief that UN operations require host government consent. Brazil also supported termination, albeit reluctantly. Russia’s abstention did not reflect opposition to ending the mission, which it supported, instead it expressed discontent with the resolution’s authorization for the Secretary-General to submit regular reports on the situation — an arrangement that would have kept Sudan’s warring factions under international scrutiny. 24
As Russia appeared to shift its support during the conflict — from the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) — it opportunistically prioritized weapons supply routes and a prospective naval base in Port Sudan. 25 These considerations shaped its abstention, while China voted in favor, on Resolution 2736 (June 2024) calling on RSF to halt fighting, on the grounds that this could empower a nonstate actor on issues of national sovereignty. The Russian representative also urged others not to “over-dramatize” famine conditions, just when famine was raging in the country. 26 In November 2024, Russia vetoed a draft resolution on the protection of civilians in Sudan (S/2024/826), despite support from African UNSC members and international condemnation of one of the world’s most egregious displacement crises.
In contrast to Russia, China wants international organizations to have oversight and conflict engagement functions. While emphasizing respect for sovereignty, Beijing does not treat it as an absolute constraint on multilateral action. It also does not have stakes in Mali, Sudan, or Libya comparable to Russia’s, which might help explain Beijing’s “mildly” interventionist posture. At the same time, China is clearly invested in preserving the UNSC’s credibility among countries in the Global South, particularly in the face of growing frustration over abuse of the veto.
Ensuring the UNSC remains engaged in African crises contributes to China’s reputation on the continent. China also continues to promote the African Union’s role, inviting its deeper involvement in managing regional affairs and supporting the organization at the China-Africa summits. While Russia also hosted an Africa summit in July 2023, it fell short of the scale and development pledges of its Chinese counterpart.
Photo: Russia’s President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with head of Sudan’s transitional sovereign council Abdel Fattah al-Burhan during a meeting on the sidelines of the Russia–Africa Summit in Sochi, Russia October 23, 2019. Credit: Sputnik/Mikhail Metzel/Kremlin via REUTERS
The divergences in UNSC voting behavior point to a fundamental contrast: China’s more substantive commitment to development — particularly in climate policy — compared to Russia’s opportunistic approach. Russia appears less capable or willing to match China’s effort, and its ad hoc policy toward the continent ultimately weakens its ability to formulate a coherent global agenda at the UN.
The Challenge of UN Reform
Both China and Russia consider their permanent membership of the UN Security Council as central to their visions of the global political order, even though they have also expressed support for reforming the UN system to “democratize” multilateralism and embrace multipolarity. In this context, both countries committed to reforms that would make the UN more responsive to contemporary global realities. However, there are clear limits to the scope and direction of change that Moscow and Beijing are willing to endorse, making UN reform a litmus test for the countries’ ideological alignment.
For example, China supported the principles laid out in the Pact for the Future, a long-debated reform initiative adopted by UNGA in September 2024 (Resolution 79/1) which includes proposals to reform veto power, pen-holding practices, and representation on the UNSC.27 In contrast, Russia opposed the adoption of the Pact, arguing the draft had not been discussed in an intergovernmental format and claiming it represented an attempt by the “collective West” to impose new obligations on the Global South. Russia even tabled its own amendment (A/79/L.3), which was promptly opposed by a group of African states and subsequently voted down by most Global South countries, including Brazil and India. China, along with Kazakhstan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, abstained.28 Russia continued to oppose the Pact in 2025, while China publicly endorsed it — marking a significant instance of ideological non-alignment between the two capitals.29
These divisions reflect broader disagreements over the future of global governance. Within the BRICS grouping, Brazil and India — key members of the bloc — have expressed their desire for more ambitious reform than China and Russia are prepared to support, especially concerning institutional practices and UNSC membership.
Photo: View of UN emblem after United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres holds a press encounter at the Security Council Stakeout on the topic of his travels to Haiti and recent developments in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, United Nations Headquarters, July 6, 2023. Credit: Anthony Behar/Sipa USA
Despite BRICS’s growing prominence in recent years, its members have not shied away from public disagreements over UN reform. India has openly criticized “a non-Western power” for obstructing reforms, including the expansion of UNSC membership, and accused China of shielding its rival Pakistan. 30 China responded by saying UNSC reforms should not cater to “the selfish interests of a few,” a veiled reference to India. 31 Russia, for its part, expressed rhetorical support for Brazil and India’s bids for permanent membership, but China remained opposed —particularly to India’s inclusion. 32 China also opposed a Brazilian proposal that suggested expanding the permanent membership to include Japan, Germany, India, and Brazil.
China-Russia alignment and BRICS
China and Russia have championed BRICS as an alternative to the G7 and a platform for amplifying the voices of emerging powers on global political and economic issues. Moscow has increasingly viewed BRICS as a vehicle for rehabilitating its international image, particularly after the condemnation in the UN General Assembly for its aggression against Ukraine. It has also attempted to frame BRICS as a geopolitical counterweight to the West, positioning the bloc as sympathetic to Russia’s global narrative. While China does not share this need for validation, it has not obstructed Russia’s efforts, occasionally recalibrating the rhetoric to maintain balance.
Between 2023 and 2025, BRICS underwent a significant transformation, expanding its membership to include five additional states. The initiative was proposed by Xi during the 2022 virtual summit and was operationalized through invitations issued in 2023, which resulted in four countries joining in 2024 and one more in 2025. Although China and Russia strongly supported expansion, Brazil and India received the proposal with caution. Brazil was concerned about BRICS becoming a China-dominated platform, but eventually gave in to the idea of expansion while trying to keep a say in the selection of new members by blocking the inclusion of Venezuela and Nicaragua.33 India voiced similar concerns about unchecked expansion and the bloc’s potential tilt toward Beijing. As the expansion proceeded, the rhetoric of a pole forming around China became so abundant that members felt compelled to clarify BRICS was not an anti-Western coalition.34 Notably, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was among the first world leaders to visit Donald Trump after his inauguration.
Map of BRICS Member States
© OpenStreetMap contributors
Founding Member
Associate Member
New Member
Applicant Nation
Invited to Join BRICS
Map: Center for European Policy AnalysisSource: BRICSEmbed Download image
Despite being a political grouping, BRICS remains a mixed bag ideologically and, while it is impossible to ascertain if Moscow ever sought to use it to leverage support for its war in Ukraine, the declarations of all three summits from 2022 to 2024 demonstrated none was forthcoming. Instead, all three key documents use vague language about adhering to the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, including the principle of state sovereignty. The declarations contain a clause that points to the diversity of views on the war: “We recall our national positions concerning the conflict in and around Ukraine as expressed at the appropriate fora, including the UNSC and UNGA,” the declarations said, but they did not go as far as condemning or supporting either party.
That members of the grouping refrained from antagonizing Russia was a diplomatic achievement for Moscow, showing that UNGA condemnation did not translate into isolation by the key rising powers. However, BRICS did not become an amplifier for Russia’s anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, leaving the permanent seat on the UNSC as Russia’s only international tribune on the issue.
The ideological diversity of the bloc has neither prevented political efforts to intensify joint policy-making nor slowed its organizational development. Both China and Russia seem to have realized that seeking ideological alignment across a broad set of issues would be counter-productive, and that the global image and impact of BRICS could best be enhanced through less contentious policy initiatives that work for a broad coalition. The last three years have seen a stronger push for such initiatives and their institutional development and, as a result, BRICS has demonstrated an outstanding degree of policy convergence among members across various issues. 35
The increase in cooperation between BRICS states after 2021 can be seen in the scope of the declarations from annual BRICS summits. While the 2021 New Delhi and 2022 Beijing declarations included 74 and 75 articles respectively, the 2023 Johannesburg Declaration grew to 94 articles, and the 2024 Kazan Declaration to 131. The growth in cooperation is a result of the intensification of ministerial meetings, expert groups and sub-summits, which laid the ground for further advances in trade, finance, climate, and cultural policies. Developing common cause between ideologically diverse members became a more pronounced practice after 2022, and amounted to building a political bloc through logrolling and prioritizing issues that would be less politically divisive than the war in Ukraine or anti-Westernism. 36 This approach also created room for tweaking issues to advance member state’s own agendas.
Photo: Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a plenary session of the BRICS summit via a video link in Moscow, Russia, August 23, 2023. Credit: Sputnik/Mikhail Klimentyev/Kremlin via REUTERS
Photo: Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a plenary session of the BRICS summit via a video link in Moscow, Russia, August 23, 2023. Credit: Sputnik/Mikhail Klimentyev/Kremlin via REUTERS
One example of such an approach can be seen in BRICS members’ visions of sustainable development and climate policies. Member states converged on supporting the UN’s COP climate goals, emphasizing commitments by developed countries to support the transition of developing countries and stressing different national circumstances. However, 2022 marked a change in rhetoric in BRICS declarations, which started objecting to “green trade barriers”.
In 2024, this opposition increased in intensity and yielded new initiatives. The Declaration that year denounced the European “carbon border adjustment mechanisms” (CBAM) as environmental pretexts and discriminatory measures, and Russia saw this as an opportunity to mobilize BRICS in opposition. On Moscow’s initiative, the grouping adopted a memorandum of understanding on the BRICS Carbon Markets Partnership and Framework on Climate Change and Sustainable Development, and established the Contact Group on Climate Change and Sustainable Development. 37 This represented visible movement in the coordination of positions in a grouping responsible for more than 40% of crude oil production and half of global CO2 emissions.
Russia seeks to minimize its own global climate responsibilities by investing in its own research and monitoring systems, providing “independent” assessments of its absorption capacity and emissions, and advocating for the responsibilities of developed nations. China, the largest global emitter, rejects the idea of CBAM and aligned with this initiative, despite investing heavily in the green transition. It is a good example of BRICS becoming an alternative platform for the mobilization of the developing world, which could exert greater pressure on developed countries, including through UN institutions and conferences.
Conclusions
Following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia soon found itself on the brink of international isolation and had to turn for help to the countries it considered friendly or allied. This diplomatic effort required the activation of bilateral ties and the pivoting of international institutions and groupings to its support. Isolated from the West, Moscow particularly sought support from China, as its neighbor, friend, and a global power. Staking everything on Beijing, to save supply chains and support its war more generally, could have greatly increased Russia’s dependency on China, with the real prospect of it becoming the latter’s client-state.
Photo: Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China speak’s at a United Nations Office at Geneva. Credit: UN Photo / Jean-Marc Ferré.
While Russia’s economic dependency on China has indeed increased, it has managed to preserve its independent status and posture through its multi-platform diplomatic effort. And, although the two countries have entered a new stage in their history of complex and multi-platform cooperation and coordination, it does not seem they are actively seeking for its transformation into a formal alliance.
The type of political friendship the countries currently maintain creates a strategic vagueness and ambiguity for their opponents while offering flexibility for the two countries to pursue their distinct global goals. In this setting, it is beneficial for China and Russia that the latter is not a dependent and client state. While there is a strong sense of coordination between the two capitals, Moscow enjoys freedom to put forward international initiatives, testing norms and world public opinion, which Beijing can choose to distance itself from or endorse.
Although Russia’s effort to persuade international forums to support its war largely failed, its presence on these platforms, with tacit support from China, helped it save and maintain its international status as a power with global aspirations. This outcome is largely in China’s interests, as Russia is its only friend with a global role and authority, even though the freedom in relations often reveals divergence in the two states’ priorities for global development. China’s vision is broader and more ambitious than anything Russia can match ideologically or materially, including the promotion of a development agenda and multilateralism.
About the Author
Evgeny Roshchin is a Visiting Scholar at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and a commentator on Russia’s foreign policy and international politics. He is the author of book “Friendship among Nations” (Manchester Uni Press), many academic articles and media commentaries.
Dr. Evgeny Roshchin received his PhD in social sciences from the University of Jyväskylä (Finland) in 2009. Until March 2022, he was the Head of School of Politics and International Relations, RANEPA St. Petersburg. He resigned from his position at RANEPA in protest of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and RANEPA St. Petersburg’s pro-war statement. From 2022 to 2024, Dr. Roshchin was a research scholar at the University Center for Human Values, Princeton University.
Acknowledgments
Special thanks to CEPA’s Democratic Resilience Intern, Alexandra Pugh, for assisting with research for this project.
CEPA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, public policy institution. All opinions expressed are those of the author(s) alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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This framework was re-confirmed at the meeting between Vladimir Putin and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on April 1, 2025, leading up to the President Xi Jinping’s official visit to Moscow on May 7-10, 2025, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76606/videos. [↩]
The two countries made political coordination in the multilateral institutions part of their pronounced foreign policy in 2024; GT Staff Reporters, “Enhanced China-Russia Cooperation to Boost Multilateral Collaboration – Global Times,” Globaltimes.cn, 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202408/1318359.shtml. [↩]
This is due to the practice of international friendship that both countries are aware of; Evgeny Roshchin, “Friendship of the Enemies: Twentieth Century Treaties of the United Kingdom and the USSR,” International Politics 48, no. 1 (December 29, 2010): 71–91, https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2010.39.; Evgeny Roshchin, Friendship among Nations (Manchester University Press, 2017). [↩]
Andrew Osborn and Mark Trevelyan, “Russia and China Proclaim ‘No Limits’ Partnership to Stand up to U.S.,” Reuters, February 4, 2022, sec. Europe, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-china-tell-nato-stop-expansion-moscow-backs-beijing-taiwan-2022-02-04/. [↩]
Such dismissal is attributed to the Chinese Ambassador to the EU Fu Cong (now at the UN); Matina Stevis-Gridneff and Steven Erlanger, “China’s Ambassador to the E.U. Tries to Distance Beijing from Moscow,” The New York Times, April 5, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/05/world/europe/eu-china-embassador-russia-fu-cong.html. [↩]
Jacek Kugler, Ronald L Tammen, and Yuzhu Zeng, “Russia,” Routledge EBooks, September 13, 2024, 111–30, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003396420-9. [↩]
John M. Owen, “China and Russia Contra Liberal Hegemony,” The United States and Contemporary China-Russia Relations, 2022, 131–53, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93982-3_6. [↩]
Gregory W Moore, “China, Russia and the United States: Balance of Power or National Narcissism?,” China, Russia and the United States: Balance of Power or National Narcissism?, January 1, 2022, 55–77, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93982-3_3. [↩]
Thomas Ambrosio, “The Architecture of Alignment: The RussiaChina Relationship and International Agreements,” EuropeAsia Studies 69, no. 1 (2017): 110–56, https://doi.org/10.2307/26156949. [↩]
Alexander Korolev, “How Closely Aligned Are China and Russia? Measuring Strategic Cooperation in IR,” International Politics 57 (May 9, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-019-00178-8. [↩]
Maria Papageorgiou and Alena Vysotskaya, “Assessing the Changing Sino–Russian Relationship: A Longitudinal Analysis of Bilateral Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Period,” Europe Asia Studies 76, no. 4 (November 21, 2023): 632–58, https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2023.2276677. [↩]
Alexander Korolev, “Measuring Strategic Cooperation in China-Russia Relations,” Springer EBooks, January 1, 2022, 29–53, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93982-3_2. [↩]
Edward Wong and Julian E. Barnes, “China Asked Russia to Delay Ukraine War until after Olympics, U.S. Officials Say,” The New York Times, March 2, 2022, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/02/us/politics/russia-ukraine-china.html. [↩]
The interview of the Foreign Minister S. Lavrov to the American bloggers M. Naufal, L. Johnson, and A.Napolitano, March 12, 2025, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/2002637/?TSPD_101_R0=08765fb817ab2000218c4d1f8517d9c756c360639387f22a0957cd8fb9618af493b384a5c3b328dc0800c422631430007a59b9118177746da8c7bab6d324f2f81a4daa616dc0fd909f1c265beb607c8fbcfa9f81b95c2a58e49264521fc3cd83. [↩]
Max Seddon et al., “Xi Jinping Warned Vladimir Putin against Nuclear Attack in Ukraine,” Financial Times, July 5, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/c5ce76df-9b1b-4dfc-a619-07da1d40cbd3. [↩]
Russia-China Joint Statement on the deepening of partnership”, May 8, 2025, http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/6309. [↩]
WTO, “China Initiates WTO Dispute Regarding US ‘Reciprocal Tariffs,’” Wto.org, 2025, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news25_e/dsrfc_08apr25_e.htm. [↩]
United Nations, “Security Council Records,” Un.org, 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/S/PV.8979. [↩]
Subramanian Swamy, “Ukraine’s Situation, India’s National Interest,” The Hindu, February 28, 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/ukraines-situation-indias-national-interest/article65094798.ece. [↩]
Dmitriy Nurullayev and Mihaela Papa, “Bloc Politics at the UN: How Other States Behave When the United States and China–Russia Disagree,” Global Studies Quarterly 3, no. 3 (July 1, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksad034. [↩]
See the latest statement at Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China, “Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Fu Cong on the UN General Assembly Draft Resolutions on the Ukraine Issue_Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN,” China-mission.gov.cn, 2025, http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/hyyfy/202502/t20250225_11561687.htm. [↩]
Russia has consistently employed this approach to protect the regime of Bashar Assad. Russia does not hesitate to use its veto, for instance, on resolutions about Syria S/2022/538 on 8 July 2022 and even the one co-drafted by Brazil S/2023/506 on 11 July 2023. Noteworthy, China did not join Russia in vetoing these. [↩]
United Nations Digital Library, “Security Council, 78th Year :: 9463rd Meeting, Tuesday, 31 October 2023, New York,” United Nations Digital Library System (UN, 2023), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4026403?ln=en&v=pdf. [↩]
United Nations, “Security Council Terminates Mandate of UN Transition Mission in Sudan, Adopting Resolution 2715 (2023) in Vote of 14 in Favour to 1 Abstention | UN Press,” press.un.org, December 1, 2023, https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15512.doc.htm. [↩]
Andrew McGregor, “Russia Switches Sides in Sudan War,” Jamestown.org, July 8, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/russia-switches-sides-in-sudan-war/. [↩]
United Nations Digital Library, “Security Council, 79th Year :: 9655th Meeting, Thursday, 13 June 2024, New York,” United Nations Digital Library System (UN, 2024), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4052414?ln=en&v=pdf. [↩]
United Nations, “SUMMIT of the FUTURE OUTCOME DOCUMENTS Pact for the Future, Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations,” 2024, https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/sotf-pact_for_the_future_adopted.pdf. [↩]
United Nations, “General Assembly Report,” Un.org, 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/PV.3. [↩]
Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, “Statement by the First Deputy Permanent Representative Dmitry Polyanskiy at a GA Intergovernmental Negotiation on the Reform of the UN Security Council (Veto Cluster),” Russiaun.ru, January 21, 2025, https://russiaun.ru/en/news/21012025.; Ministry of Foreign Affairs The People’s Republic of China, “Remarks by H.E. Wang Yi at the United Nations Security Council High-Level Meeting ‘Practicing Multilateralism, Reforming and Improving Global Governance’_Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,” Fmprc.gov.cn, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202502/t20250219_11558555.html. [↩]
PTI, “Disguised Veto: India Calls out Secrecy over Rejection, Putting on Hold Listing Bids at UNSC Subsidiary Bo,” The Economic Times (Economic Times, February 28, 2025), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/disguised-veto-india-calls-out-secrecy-over-rejection-putting-on-hold-listing-bids-at-unsc-subsidiary-bodies/articleshow/118614983.cms. [↩]
Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “China Says UN Reforms Should Not Serve ‘Selfish Interests of a Few’ after Jaishankar’s Comments on Non-Wes,” The Economic Times (Economic Times, March 2, 2024), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/china-says-un-reforms-should-not-serve-selfish-interests-of-a-few-after-jaishankars-comments-on-non-western-nation-blocking-reforms/articleshow/108151721.cms. [↩]
Amy Sood, “India’s Renewed Push for Permanent UN Security Council Seat Faces Persistent China Roadblock,” South China Morning Post, October 3, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3280762/indias-renewed-push-permanent-un-security-council-seat-faces-persistent-china-roadblock. See also Dhananjay Tripathi, “4 Obstacles to India Joining the UN Security Council,” Thediplomat.com (The Diplomat, September 20, 2024), https://thediplomat.com/2024/09/4-obstacles-to-india-joining-the-un-security-council/. [↩]
“Brasil barra convite à Venezuela para ser novo parceiro do Brics; Maduro chega de surpresa à cúpula,” Folha de S.Paulo, October 22, 2024, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2024/10/brasil-barra-convite-a-venezuela-para-ser-novo-parceiro-do-brics.shtml. [↩]
“Na presidência do G20, Lula terá de buscar equilíbrio entre EUA e China, dizem analistas,” O Globo, September 4, 2023, https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2023/09/04/na-presidencia-do-g20-lula-tera-de-buscar-equilibrio-entre-eua-e-china-dizem-analistas.ghtml.; “Cúpula do Brics mostra que mundo não pode ser mais ditado pelo G7, diz Amorim,” O Globo, August 22, 2023, https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2023/08/22/cupula-do-brics-mostra-que-mundo-nao-pode-ser-mais-ditado-pelo-g7-diz-amorim.ghtml; “高清大图｜习近平主席为‘大金砖合作’擘画未来-新华网,” accessed April 14, 2025, http://www.news.cn/20241024/1dfb0cb66ccc4329a801354fb7e26c40/c.html. [↩]
Mihaela Papa, Zhen Han, and Frank O’Donnell, “The Dynamics of Informal Institutions and Counter-Hegemony: Introducing a BRICS Convergence Index,” European Journal of International Relations 29, no. 4 (July 13, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661231183352. [↩]
The same theory was previously suggested to understand Sino-Russian complex relations, see Kyle Haynes, “Sino-Russian Logrolling and the Future of Great Power Competition,” Springer EBooks, January 1, 2022, 231–52, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93982-3_10. [↩]
TASS, “Reshetnikov Proposed to the BRICS Countries to Create a Contact Group on Sustainable Development,” TASS, August 8, 2023, https://tass.ru/ekonomika/18467231. [↩]
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