ASIA TIMES - Middle powers, not great ones, shaping the new world order Eurasia’s middle powers are bridging the widening US-China divide and resetting the global stage in the process by Miras Zhiyenbayev June 2, 2025

 ASIA  TIMES

Middle powers, not great ones, shaping the new world order

Eurasia’s middle powers are bridging the widening US-China divide and resetting the global stage in the process

by Miras Zhiyenbayev

June 2, 2025

An Indonesian military honour guard marks the 60th anniversary of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung. Photo: X Screengrab / Indonesian Government

In traditional international relations theory, the term “middle power” has been defined by quantifiable metrics – a state that ranks somewhere in the middle of the global hierarchy in terms of size, military strength or economic heft.

This vertical, power-based definition implicitly casts middle powers as second-tier countries: stronger than small states but materially weaker than the great powers at the top of the pyramid.

However, a purely power-based label fails to capture the true dynamics of today’s world, where many so-called middle powers punch well above their weight diplomatically and great powers often find their will constrained.

It also obscures the agency and creativity these states now exhibit on the global stage. Therefore, it’s much more practical to define “middle power” horizontally rather than vertically – focusing on a state’s geopolitical position and behavior rather than its size alone.

What would a horizontal definition of middle powers look like? Essentially, it reframes “middle” not as a middling level of power, but as a position between great powers on the global chessboard.

In this view, middle powers are the influential states that sit at the intersection of great-power interests, bridging different spheres and often serving as pivots or swing players in international politics.

They are the connectors and mediators, the ones “in the middle” geographically or diplomatically, between rival blocs or distant poles of power. This notion aligns with how many analysts now describe countries like Turkey, Brazil, Kazakhstan or Indonesia – not simply in terms of GDP rank or military spending, but in terms of being pivotal nodes between East and West, North and South.

Crucially, this horizontal lens decouples “middle power” from the idea of subordination. A state can be middle-positioned and still be highly influential. Middle powers under this definition distinguish themselves by showing leadership in specific areas, acting as linchpins in regional cooperation, or brokering between bigger players.

By focusing on geopolitical functions and relationships, the horizontal approach recognizes that a state’s importance stems also from where it sits in the international network and how it leverages that position.

Viewing middle powers as the “in-between actors” also better reflects the current multipolar reality. They are the glue in an increasingly fragmented order – the brokers who can talk to all sides. For them, world politics is a web, not a ladder.

In that web, middling states are often nodes of connectivity and agents of order-building. The horizontal perspective thus appreciates their qualitative power: convening ability, agenda-setting capacity, coalition-building skill – things that don’t show up in a simple ranking of GDP.

Yes, no middle power can single-handedly dictate the international agenda – but the same is increasingly true even for “great” powers in the 21st century. The diffusion of power, rise of international institutions and the globalization of problems have eroded the omnipotence of any single hegemon.

No great power today can achieve its goals without cooperation or at least acquiescence from a broader set of states. The United States, China, and Russia – none enjoys the kind of unchecked dominance that past empires did.

The costs of coercion have risen; nationalism makes occupation or overt control infeasible; global media and norms impose reputational costs on bullying behavior. Meanwhile, economic and technological interdependence mean even superpowers can’t go it alone effectively.

This gives middle powers breathing room and leverage. Great powers now must court allies and partners – creating an opportunity for those partners to extract concessions or shape terms.

In this environment, middle powers can wield outsized influence by mobilizing collective action and exploiting niches where great powers are either indifferent or stalemated. When great powers cannot simply dictate outcomes, the middle powers in between gain room to maneuver.

The horizontal conception of middle powers places agency at the center: these states are actors in their own right, not just subjects of great-power plots. As such, they often have strategic autonomy goals very similar to great powers – namely, preserving their sovereignty and shaping their environment to suit their interests.

Middle powers seek a stable order that is not dominated by any single patron. They do not passively accept client status in someone’s sphere; they push back, negotiate and sometimes align together to prevent such outcomes. The Non-Aligned Movement of the Cold War was an early manifestation of this ethos.

Today, a new form of alignment – one based on issues and principles rather than blocs – is emerging among these countries. They are willing to work with great powers, but on a case-by-case basis, and they are equally willing to form South–South or “middle–middle” coalitions to protect their interests.

Nowhere is the rise of empowered middle powers more evident than in Eurasia, where multiple great powers overlap and a host of ambitious middle states reside. In this complex chessboard, Eurasian middle powers, especially those with histories in the Global South or post-colonial world, have honed a pragmatic, coalition-driven diplomacy that sets them apart.

These nations – think of Indonesia, Malaysia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, UAE, Qatar or even ASEAN as a collective entity – tend to be less ideologically encumbered and more flexible in forging partnerships. Having emerged from eras of colonialism or superpower rivalry, they are instinctively wary of dependency and adept at multi-alignment.

These post-Global South middle powers are arguably best suited to lead future middle-power cooperation. Why?

First, they bring a pragmatic mindset honed by necessity. Unlike some traditional middle powers of the West (e.g. Canada or Australia) that were closely aligned with the US during the Cold War, countries like India or Indonesia have long experience in non-alignment and forging South–South partnerships.

Their diplomacy is less about idealistic crusades and more about practical outcomes – development, stability, and voice for the developing world.

Second, they excel at coalition-driven diplomacy. Whether through the G77, NAM, OIC or newer forums like BRICS and MIKTA, these states have practice coordinating with diverse partners. They tend to seek inclusive solutions rather than exclusive clubs.

Third, their multi-alignment credibility is high: having balanced East-West and North-South relations, they can act as bridges and this ability to talk to all sides makes them effective go-betweens.

The growing agency of middle powers is a reason for optimism. It means that the future of international relations need not be a simple G2 condominium or a clash of titans with everyone else as collateral. The world’s geopolitical center of gravity is shifting not just from West to East, but from the giants to the coalitions of the mid-sized.

In this brave new world, “middle” no longer means meek. It means being in the middle of action, often driving it. Ultimately, recognizing middle powers for what they truly are – autonomous agents and shapers of outcomes – allows us to better understand and harness their contributions.

As great-power rivalry looms large, it is these states in between, with their coalition-driven diplomacy and refusal to be pigeonholed, that may save the day by preventing a descent into polarized blocs.

And in that lies a hopeful possibility: that a concert of “swing” states can together steer the world toward cooperation, equity and peace, proving that strength is not solely a function of size, and that being “in the middle” can be a position of power in its own right.