Italyan Düşünce Kuruluşu ISPI, 11-12 Temmuz'da Vilnius'ta yapılacak NATO Zirve toplantısı ile ilgili yedi adet değerlendirme yazısı yayınladı. Aşağıda, bu yazıların konu özetlerini açıklayan giriş bölümünü okuyabilirsiniz. Daha sonra, yedi yazının ingilizce metinleri ayrı ayrı sunulacaktır.
The leaders of NATO countries will meet in Vilnius, Lithuania, on July 11-12. The summit will provide an opportunity to further coordinate the Alliance’s support for Ukraine, which was invaded by Russia in February 2022, and also to assess significant future challenges. Key topics on the agenda include Sweden’s membership, security assurances for Kyiv, and various other issues such as innovation programs in defense production and strategic outlook. Will NATO be able to adopt a comprehensive and unified approach to tackle these urgent matters?
6 Jul 2023
Antonio Missiroli
Crisis, Adaptation and Future: What to Expect From the NATO Summit
Which issues will be on the NATO agenda in the months and years to come?
COMMENTARY TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
The NATO Summit to be held in Vilnius on 11-12 July is an important step in the continuous process of adaptation of the Alliance. Lithuania joined the Alliance almost 20 years ago, in 2004, and this summit marks the first NATO meeting of heads-of-state in a Baltic capital city since the 2006 Riga Summit. It is also the second summit since the start of the (second) Russian invasion of Ukraine, and it is set to lay the groundwork also for the summit planned for the spring of 2024 in Washington to mark the 75th anniversary of the treaty that established the Alliance.
The agenda for Vilnius is still being fine-tuned by the North Atlantic Council but it will focus first and foremost on the collective assessment of and response to the ongoing war, also in terms of defence planning. Both the decision over the successor to Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg (at the helm since October 2014, shortly after the first Russian invasion) and the welcoming of Sweden as the 32nd ally are likely to be postponed to the Washington meeting, which will take place right before the vote for the European Parliament and, above all, the US Presidential elections.
This ISPI Dossier aims to offer a thorough review of the main issues on the Vilnius agenda – including expectations and perceptions of key players – as well as an in-depth analysis of some of the issues that will remain on the NATO agenda in the months and years to come.
Camille Grand illustrates the priorities that need addressing by the allies and the factors and considerations that will shape the outcome of the summit, while Julian Lindley-French focuses on desirables and deliverables. Both Camille Grand and Ondrej Ditrych devote special attention to the dilemmas related to securing Ukraine also beyond the current warfighting stage, including the prospect of future NATO membership and the steps that may be taken before (and in preparation of) that. Grand’s formula “neither Bucharest nor Budapest” – with reference to past attempts (in 2008 and 1994, respectively) to do precisely that – captures well the range of options available to the Alliance and the lessons to be learned from past failures. Ditrych’s appeal to prevent and deter further “Putinic wars”, in turn, puts the ongoing conflict in a wider strategic context while suggestively evoking ancient Rome’s own “Punic wars” – a total of three so far for Moscow (with Georgia 2008 and Ukraine 2014), albeit without it encountering the same fate as Carthage. The various options still under discussion to secure Ukraine, at any rate, will have to be able to preserve allied unity while providing adequate deterrence in both the short and the longer term.
William Alberque dwells upon the big strategic picture and the broader challenges facing the Alliance in terms of both doctrine adaptation and capability development. The uncertainty of the military situation on the ground should not prevent the Allies from updating their posture – especially in the nuclear domain and with respect to arms control – and looking to a future that requires anticipation and foresight as well as bold choices and sizeable resources.
Andrea Gilli provides a balanced and comprehensive SWOT analysis of the challenges posed to the Alliance by the onset and spread of emerging and disruptive technologies that, while stemming primarily from the civilian realm and the private sector, increasingly and decisively affect also deterrence and defence policies, and assesses the scope of the initiatives taken so far in this domain. Gilli correctly emphasises that innovation is a process rather than an outcome and pinpoints the differences – e.g. in terms of risk propensity – between the current ecosystem of Big Tech companies and that of multilateral security organisations like NATO.
Last but certainly not least, Sophia Besch reviews the recent development and marked improvement of relations between NATO and the EU, emphasising the catalyst effect of the Russo-Ukrainian war, appreciating the “parallel convergence” – so to speak – of the two organisations in their joint (and mutually complementary) support to Kyiv, but also highlighting the structural factors that still affect their relationship and which could re-emerge in the future.
Needless to say, for the Alliance – any alliance – the way in which an ongoing conflict at its doorstep may evolve and end will have both tactical and strategic implications and is bound to shape future deliberations. The increasing frequency of NATO summits testifies to the importance of close consultation and quick adaptation in response to an ever changing and expanding spectrum of threats. After Madrid last year, therefore, now comes Vilnius, and after Vilnius Washington, although security cooperation among allies and with like-minded partners is not limited to summitry or the sheer Euro-Atlantic framework, as the recent record of the G7 and other mini-lateral formats has demonstrated.
One thing is now clear though: the Alliance is essential for the defence of Europe, acting as a ‘deterrent of last resort’ against Putin’s Russia and protecting its most exposed members; threats to Allies, however, do not emanate only from Russia, and are not only of a conventional/military nature. For NATO, refining and expanding both its toolbox and its playbook is a task that will not end with the current war and will require leadership, resolve and staying power in the capitals. And not only or primarily in Washington: European allies will have to get their act together, both individually and collectively, and allocate the necessary resources to the common endeavour.
In this context, European defence may have to find a new modus operandi, not only complementing (at best) but also integrating NATO efforts as and when necessary, and especially in the event of a possible future redeployment of American forces and capabilities from the Euro-Atlantic area to other theatres. A more European NATO, in which EU endeavours in security and defence complement and reinforce rather than compete with NATO’s, is indeed the next big challenge – without prejudice to the EU’s own distinctive activities in civilian crisis management, military capacity-building or defence industrial cooperation. And, after Vilnius, this challenge will have to be met with fresh approaches and open-mindedness within both the Alliance and the Union
Vilnius and Beyond: Containing Russia and the Future “Putinic Wars”
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